Cade Cunningham Off the Ball: Detroit Pistons' Tactical Gamble for the 2026-26 Season

The number 1.41 points per possession (PPP) in spot-up and handoff situations for Cade Cunningham during the recent playoffs is a data point almost too beautiful to believe. Ranking in the 96.6th percentile league-wide, far above the league average of 0.98 PPP. But I've followed the transfer market long enough to know: numbers in contracts don't lie, but the people reading them know how to hide. And with a statistical sample of just 41 catch-and-shoot attempts and 18 one-to-two-dribble possessions, that 1.41 PPP figure needs to be viewed with the caution of someone who once paid 5 million euros in credibility for haste. The context of the issue begins with the 2026-25 season, when the Detroit Pistons finished with a 14-win record – one of the worst seasons in franchise history. Cade Cunningham, the number one star handed a 5-year, $224 million max extension in 2026, was forced to carry nearly the entire offensive system. He handled the ball, called pick-and-rolls, created opportunities for himself and his teammates. The result: a pick-and-roll efficiency of just 0.87 PPP, and isolation even worse at 0.76 PPP – both below league average. But the question is: do these numbers reflect Cunningham's true ability, or are they merely the result of a roster severely lacking offensive spacing? Entering the summer of 2026, the Pistons' front office led by president Trajan Langdon made a series of moves showing they understand the problem. Four new signings – Joe, Collins, Prince, and Harris – all shot over 40% from three-point range last season. These aren't blockbuster contracts, but a strategy of buying low on accurate shooters – a typical approach for financially smart teams. Collins at $26 million per year is the biggest investment, but also the biggest risk if his shooting performance doesn't hold up. The key to this season's tactical plan lies in one name: Ausar Thompson. The 23-year-old is expected to become the secondary ball-handler, allowing Cunningham to transition to a more off-ball role. Thompson has had joint workouts with Cunningham this summer, and both have expressed optimism about the combination. But I've witnessed too many tactical plans collapse due to one weak link. Thompson suffered an ankle injury last season, and his shooting ability remains a major question mark. If opponents leave Thompson open to help on defense, the entire off-ball system for Cunningham could be neutralized from the start. Playoff data is the most important foundation for this strategy. Cunningham shot 48.8% on catch-and-shoot threes, 1.30 PPP in spot-up situations (84th percentile), and 1.41 PPP in no-dribble handoffs (96.6th percentile). Interestingly, his efficiency off the ball was even better than when handling the ball – the opposite of the image of a star who only dominates the ball and creates his own opportunities. This evokes the Jokic-Murray model of the Denver Nuggets, where the biggest star is willing to cede playmaking duties to a secondary creator to find easier opportunities. But it must be emphasized: this statistical sample is too small to draw firm conclusions. 41 catch-and-shoot attempts in the playoffs cannot compare to the pressure of an 82-game season. In terms of team operations, the Pistons are in a relatively flexible financial state. Cunningham's max contract takes up a large portion of the salary cap, but short-term deals for Joe, Prince, and Harris create future flexibility. Thompson remains on a rookie contract of about $8 million per year – a valuable asset if he develops as expected. However, if Collins doesn't maintain his shooting efficiency, his $26 million contract could become a burden. This is a calculated gamble, but the risk is real. The counterintuitive perspective I want to offer here: is the entire narrative about Cunningham playing off-ball overlooking a more fundamental issue? Look at his 0.87 PPP pick-and-roll efficiency – this number could improve significantly simply by having better shooters on the floor, without changing Cunningham's role. When opponents must respect the shooting of Joe, Collins, Prince, and Harris, the space for Cunningham to operate with the ball will be much wider. In other words, adding shooters could automatically boost Cunningham's on-ball efficiency without moving him to an off-ball role. This is a blind spot in the official narrative presented by The Athletic. Another issue also being overlooked: the Pistons' defense. The Athletic's analysis focuses entirely on the offensive side, but a team that won only 14 games last season cannot improve by fixing just one end of the court. Bickerstaff, who built a solid defensive foundation in Cleveland, understands this well. But the question is whether the defensive system will suffer when Thompson – one of the team's best defenders – has to expend more energy on offensive playmaking. In terms of market expectations, the Pistons are projected to win around 30-35 games this season. If the new system runs smoothly, 35-40 wins is entirely feasible – a significant step up from last season's 14 wins. But I want to emphasize: don't rush to conclusions after the first 5-10 games. Wait at least 20 games for a sufficiently large sample to evaluate the true effectiveness of the new system. I was once faster than a phone call and paid 5 million euros in credibility for it – that lesson still holds value. Looking ahead, there are three signals to track. First: if Thompson averages over 5 assists per game in the first 20 games, it shows he's capable of being a playmaker. Second: if Cunningham's catch-and-shoot three-point percentage stays above 42% on more than 2 attempts per game, the off-ball strategy is working. Third: if the Pistons' offensive rating enters the top 15 in the league (equivalent to over 115 points per 100 possessions), the new system is truly functioning. Conversely, if Cunningham's off-ball PPP drops below 1.10, the coaching staff should consider reverting to more on-ball actions for him. There are no garbage rumors, only people who read rumors hastily. And in this case, there are no wrong tactics, only unrealistic expectations about a sample size that's too small. The Detroit Pistons are heading in the right direction with building a more diverse offensive system, reducing the load on Cunningham and creating conditions for Thompson to develop. But the success of this plan depends on too many variables: Thompson's health, the new signings' ability to maintain their shooting performance, and whether opponents find ways to counter Cunningham's off-ball system. The scenario I believe in: the Pistons will improve significantly from last season, reaching 35-38 wins and competing for a play-in spot in the East. Cunningham will raise his overall efficiency to All-Star level, but not MVP level – the team is still too young and inexperienced. And if Thompson gets injured again, the entire plan collapses, forcing the Pistons back to an offense completely dependent on Cunningham. That's the biggest risk Detroit's front office accepts when betting on the development of a young player with many weaknesses. The summer market doesn't start at the airport, but in the filing cabinets of legal offices. And the 2026-26 season for the Detroit Pistons won't be decided in the first practices, but in the ability to sustain the system over 82 games – where small statistical samples must face the harsh reality of a long season. Can Cunningham maintain his 1.41 PPP off-ball efficiency over a full season? Can Thompson stay healthy and skilled enough to handle the playmaking role? These questions will have answers only after the first 20 games of the season. And I, as someone who once paid for haste, will wait with the patience of one who has learned that accuracy always matters more than speed.